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NSA review completed

ARMY review(s)
completed.

DIA review(s)
completed.



Tenth Report

**COMMUNIST VIOLATIONS OF
THE VIETNAM AND LAOS SETTLEMENT AGREEMENTS**

(This report covers the week from
20 April through 26 April 1973)

*This memorandum has been prepared jointly by the
Central Intelligence Agency and the Department of Defense*

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Tenth Report

COMMUNIST VIOLATIONS OF
THE VIETNAM AND LAOS SETTLEMENT AGREEMENTS*(This report covers the week from
20 April through 26 April 1973)The Key Points

- The only new North Vietnamese infiltrators detected starting south during the week were about 80 non-combat personnel--civil and military specialists.
- Heavy North Vietnamese logistic activity continues, however, all along the Ho Chi Minh trail in southern Laos and in northern South Vietnam.
- We have received further evidence that the Communists are continuing to construct roads which parallel the Ho Chi Minh trail system, but are located wholly inside South Vietnam.
- They are also extending a road toward Sa Huynh in Quang Ngai Province, a town which they tried to capture for a seaport at the time of the ceasefire.
- Combat activity during the week was at a low level in both South Vietnam and Laos.

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The Details

NOTE: This is the tenth in a series of reports detailing recently received evidence of (a) Communist efforts to infiltrate new manpower and military materiel toward and into South Vietnam, and (b) Communist-instigated combat activity in violation of the Vietnam and Laos settlement agreements.

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A. Infiltration and Redeployments of North Vietnamese Personnel

1. The only new North Vietnamese infiltrators noted departing North Vietnam during the past week were in one small group of civil and military specialists. Seven other small groups of specialists, who probably left North Vietnam about a month ago, were detected for the first time farther south in the infiltration system. All together, these eight groups total only some 200 men.

2. For over a month, we have been carrying an estimate of 35,000 North Vietnamese personnel who have infiltrated into South Vietnam or adjacent border areas since 28 January (25,000 of whom were in the pipeline as of that date, and 10,000 of whom started the trip south after that date). As a result of a careful re-appraisal of all available evidence, both CIA and DIA now conclude that the estimate of about 25,000 infiltrators in the pipeline as of 28 January remains valid, but that the estimate of new infiltrators starting the trip south since that date should be raised to 15,500--giving a new total of more than 40,000 North Vietnamese personnel who have been in the infiltration system at one time or another since the ceasefire went into effect. Part of this increase comes from the addition of the specialist groups which we have detected infiltrating

in each of the recent weeks--but which individually were too small to add into our rounded totals. Another part of the increase comes from the detection of several groups which started a month or more ago. Also, a reassessment of estimated travel times--owing to increased use of trucks to transport infiltrates--increased the number of post-ceasefire starts. Of the new total of over 40,000, some 3,000 to 4,500 are civil or military specialists, and the remainder are combat replacement troops. All but about 2,000 of the 40,000 have now completed their journey south and have left the infiltration pipeline. (ANNEX II, [] contains a more detailed discussion of the information pertaining to North Vietnamese infiltration which was received during the past week.)

3. New evidence on the status of the 312th and 304th NVA Divisions was received this week. The headquarters of the 312th NVA Division was again identified west of Vinh, further strengthening the likelihood that this division has left, or is in the process of leaving, South Vietnam's Quang Tri Province. None of the division's subordinate regiments, however, has yet been identified in North Vietnam. The status of the 304th NVA division is less clear. Tenuous information has located elements of the division headquarters in the western DMZ while at the same time other elements of the division have been detected in both southern North Vietnam and northern South Vietnam. The pattern of the 304th's current deployment could mean that it is temporarily rotating some of its combat units to North Vietnam for rest and refitting or it could mean that the division actually is withdrawing entirely to the North.

4. Another NVA anti-aircraft artillery regiment has been identified operating in the vicinity of Khe Sanh. The regiment originally deployed from the Hanoi area in early January and arrived in southern Laos shortly before the 28 January Vietnam ceasefire. Subsequently, the regiment moved into South Vietnam--almost certainly after 28 January and almost certainly in violation of the ceasefire agreement. The total number of line anti-aircraft

artillery regiments now known to be operating in the Khe Sanh area is four; in addition there is one North Vietnamese SAM regiment in the area, and other AAA units subordinate to the NVA logistics structure.

5. In another development, an NVA regiment which has been operating in Binh Long Province of GVN MR 3 may have moved to Hong Ngu District in Kien Phong Province of GVN MR 4. The regiment reportedly left Binh Long Province in late February and arrived in MR 4 in early April. If this redeployment has in fact occurred, it would be the first interregional redeployment of a major Communist unit in southern South Vietnam since the ceasefire.

B. Movement of Military Equipment and Supplies Toward and Into South Vietnam and Laos

6. The reporting period was again characterized by heavy Communist logistical activity in southern North Vietnam, the Laos Panhandle, and northern South Vietnam. Detected vehicle traffic was unusually high in the Laos Panhandle, particularly on Route 99, a main north-south road extending through the central Panhandle. Continuing NVA truck traffic was also seen on the primary feeder routes from southern Laos into the northern regions of South Vietnam. The level of NVA logistic activity within South Vietnam was down somewhat from the previous week, but there was again hard evidence of large quantities of munitions being shipped to and stored in Quang Tri Province and the Laos/South Vietnam border region of GVN MR 1. Logistic activity in the southern part of North Vietnam continued at the level of the preceding several weeks, and truck traffic moving south through the entry corridors into Laos was also at about the same level as that observed last week. (See Annex III, [] for a brief statement concerning the recent deterioration in our intelligence on truck traffic moving from North Vietnam into Laos.) Small quantities of supplies also were seen moving from Vinh toward destinations in northern Laos.

7. The following instances of Communist logistic activity were observed in South Vietnam during the week. Activity observed in South Vietnam probably reflects supplies which have recently entered the country. (The map on the following page shows the roads and route numbers which appear below.)

- (a) Evidence of the following Communist road construction activity in South Vietnam was received during the reporting period.


(1) [] a 4-mile extension of motorable road was observed on Route 614 south of the A Shau Valley. Currently, there is an 18-mile gap between the limit of construction on Route 614 and similar road improvement activity occurring on Route 14.

(2) [] there was an 8-mile segment of newly constructed road extending east from Route 514 to within 5 miles of the coastal town of Sa Huynh in Quang Ngai Province.

(3) [] a 52-mile segment of cleared road was observed extending south from the Route 19 border crossing in Pleiku Province into central Darlac Province.

- (b) On 20 April, the major NVA logistic unit operating in northern Quang Tri Province shipped about 210 tons of munitions southward on Route 608/616. The total included nearly 150 tons of 160-mm mortar ammunition.

- (c) [] 42 cargo trucks were observed on Route 9 between Dong Ha and the Laos border (23 eastbound, 7 westbound, 12 parked).



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- (d) [] there were 36 cargo vehicles parked on a feeder road running south from Route 9 southwest of Dong Ha.

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- (e) [] 13 cargo trucks were observed on Route 9 west of Cam Lo (7 eastbound, 6 parked). Also on that date, 16 trucks were seen on Route 1 north of Dong Ha (1 northbound, 5 southbound, 10 parked), as well as 24 buses parked along the road.

8. During the reporting period the following indications of North Vietnamese logistic activity in southern Laos were noted. Historical precedent would suggest that much of this activity probably involved supplies destined for South Vietnam.

- (a) The following NVA vehicle activity was observed during the reporting period on Route 99 between Muong Nong and the route's intersection with Route 96 southeast of Ban Bac.

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- (1) [] -180 cargo vehicle (17 northbound, 51 southbound, 112 parked).

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- (2) [] 47 cargo vehicles (1 northbound, 42 southbound, 4 parked).

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- (3) [] -164 cargo trucks (43 southbound, 67 northbound, 54 parked).

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- (4) [] -262 cargo trucks (113 northbound, 91 southbound, 58 parked).

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- (5) [] -146 cargo trucks (49 northbound, 17 southbound, 80 parked).

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- (6) [] 107 cargo vehicles (25 northbound, 30 southbound, 52 parked).

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- (b) The following activity was observed on Route 92 north of Muong Nong during the reporting period: 82 cargo vehicles on 19 April (47 northbound, 27 southbound, 8 parked); 23 cargo vehicles on 20 April (5 northbound, 18 southbound); 34 cargo trucks on 23 April (20 northbound, 14 southbound); 13 trucks on 24 April (5 northbound, 8 southbound); 83 cargo trucks on 25 April (44 northbound, 39 southbound).
- (c) During the period 20 through 22 April, a number of NVA logistic units operating in the Laos Panhandle adjacent to or in GVN MR 1 handled large shipments of supplies, consisting primarily of ordnance and ammunition. Three unlocated storage facilities in the area were observed receiving over 2,000 tons of munitions over the three-day period.
- (d) On 20 April, an NVA logistic unit operating in the Laos Panhandle adjacent to central GVN MR 1 received a total of 95 vehicles. 40 of these moved on to an unknown destination.
- (e) [] 47 cargo vehicles were seen traveling on Route 966 east of Chavane (31 eastbound, 6 westbound, 10 parked). There were also 47 vehicles observed on this route on 24 April (34 eastbound, 7 westbound, 6 parked).
- (f) [] there were 75 cargo trucks on Route 9211 southeast of Saravane (13 northbound, 29 southbound, 33 parked). [] 82 cargo vehicles were observed on this route (10 northbound, 70 southbound, 2 parked). [] 32 cargo vehicles were detected on the route (2 northbound, 21 southbound, 9 parked).

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- (g) [] 70 eastbound cargo trucks were moving on Route 9 east of Tchepone.

9. There is additional evidence of the continuing movement within North Vietnam of military and other supplies which are probably destined for South Vietnam and/or Laos.

- (a) On 19 April, an NVA logistic unit in the southern North Vietnam Panhandle offloaded over 300 tons of foodstuffs and medical supplies from barges on the Gianh River and shipped out over 100 tons of rice.
- (b) On 20 April, over 90 tons of gasoline and rice were shipped on 18 trucks from Vinh westward on Route 7 to northern Laos.
- (c) During the period 21-23 April, over 240 vehicles were noted transiting the operational area of an NVA logistic unit south of Dong Hoi.
- (d) On 24 April, eight cargo trucks transported 41 tons of rice from a storage area near Vinh to an NVA logistic unit located on Route 7 at the Laos border.

C. Combat Activity Initiated by Communist Forces In South Vietnam Since the Ceasefire

10. In South Vietnam, the total number of Communist-initiated ceasefire violations reported by the South Vietnamese Armed Forces since 28 January and for the last week (20-26 April) are shown below:

Military Region	Total Since Ceasefire Level of Action		Last Week (20-26 Apr) Level of Action	
	Major	Minor	Major	Minor
MR 1	817	2,758	39	111
MR 2	196	1,316	10	85
MR 3	290	1,843	14	101
MR 4	444	4,047	26	277
Totals	1,747	9,964	89(116)1/	574(633)1/

1/ Denotes totals of previous week.

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11. Some of these violations may have been initiated by GVN forces rather than Communist forces, and it is impossible in all cases to determine the actual instigator. The table above and the chart on the following page, however, do show fairly accurately the trend in the amount of combat that has occurred in South Vietnam since the ceasefire. The fact that a combat incident occurred at a particular time and place is generally reported accurately by the South Vietnamese, even though the question of who started it may not always be treated in objective fashion. In some cases, the Joint Military Commission (GVN/PRG) also reports violations of the ceasefire.

12. The following is a chronological listing of only the most significant "major" Communist violations of the ceasefire in South Vietnam that were reported by the South Vietnamese Armed Forces during the past week.

MILITARY REGION 1

Between 20 and 26 April friendly units west and southwest of Hue received 2,576 rounds in 36 separate attacks-by-fire.

MILITARY REGION 2

On 21 and 24 April, enemy forces attacked elements of two infantry battalions three miles southeast of Bong Son in Binh Dinh Province.

MILITARY REGION 3

Enemy pressure against the Tonle Cham base camp continued at a decreasing level between 21 and 27 April.

MILITARY REGION 4


On 19, 20, and 21 April, enemy forces attacked elements of an ARVN infantry regiment on six separate occasions 12 miles northeast of Chau Duc.




CEASE-FIRE VIOLATIONS IN SOUTH VIETNAM AS REPORTED BY RVNAF

(28 JANUARY 1973 TO THE PRESENT)


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
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D. Combat Activity Initiated by Communist Forces
in Laos During the Week from 20-26 April

13. Three major incidents were recorded in North Laos during the week. The first involved the capture by Communist forces of three Royal Lao Army (FAR) defensive positions in northwestern Sayaboury Province. The other two involved Communist ground and shelling attacks which caused the abandonment of FAR positions north and southeast of the Plain of Jars. No major military activity was reported in South Laos during the week.

14. Following is a brief account of significant combat incidents which occurred between 20 and 26 April, and which were clearly initiated by Communist forces in violation of the Laos ceasefire agreement:

- (a) On 20 April, a Communist battalion launched simultaneous attacks against three Government positions in northwestern Sayaboury Province. All three positions were lost. (These positions are west of the Mekong River and as close as 5 kilometers to the Thai border.) The Royal Lao Government is currently--as of 26 April--redeploying several FAR units into position to counterattack in this area.
- (b) On 21 April, no significant military activity occurred throughout Laos.
- (c) On 22 April, a Communist battalion attacked and captured the FAR position at Phou Vieng, 20 kilometers northwest of Bouam Long in Military Region II. The attack was supported by over 400 rounds of mortar and artillery fire.
- (d) On 23 April, no significant activity occurred in Laos.
- (e) On 24 April, military activity remained light throughout Laos.

- (f) On 25 April, activity again was at a low level in Laos.
- (g) On 26 April, a Communist ground and shelling attack drove Government forces further from the vicinity of Tha Vieng, southeast of the Plain of Jars. This sector was the scene of recent heavy fighting which triggered a U.S. bombing response.

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ANNEX II

Post-Ceasefire Infiltration of North Vietnamese
Personnel to the South

1. During the reporting period, a total of eight special-purpose infiltration groups were initially detected at various points in the infiltration pipeline. One of these groups--with a reported strength of 83--was detected at Binh Tram 18 in the Vinh area of North Vietnam, while the other seven appeared deeper in the pipeline in Laos and Cambodia. In addition to these eight groups, there were two references to several other "A"-designated groups (probably consisting of civilian administrators) in communications of Binh Tram 18. Since there was no mention either of unique group designators or of specific departure dates from the Vinh area, these groups have not been included in the listing of infiltration starts.

2. Further analysis of the intercepted message citing group 1003--reported as an initial detection in last week's issue of Ceasefire Developments in Indochina--has revealed that in fact it was a reference to group 2003. As this group was initially detected in North Vietnam in mid-January and included in our estimate at that time, the changed group designator will not affect the infiltration totals.

3. The following table lists those infiltration groups which were detected for the first time during the past week.

Infiltration Groups Initially Reported
During the Past Week

<u>Group Designator</u>	<u>Strength</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Date of Detection</u>
A 182	10	South Laos	17 April
A 194	Unk	South Laos	17 April
A 215	Unk	Cambodia	7 April
A 327	17	South Laos	17 April
L 736	83	North Vietnam	22 April
QL 262	15	South Laos	19 April
Y 182	5	South Laos	17 April
Z 101	Unk	South Laos	19 April

ANNEX III

[redacted] Truck Traffic on the Entry
Corridors into Southern Laos

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[redacted] we believe the photographic evidence of heavy truck traffic throughout south Laos indicates a continuing heavy flow of vehicles out of North Vietnam.



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